

Lecture 10: Cross-Sectional Analysis – Aggregation

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The aggregation problem

- Last time we characterized the estimand of typical **cross-sectional regressions**
- We saw that there's an issue—the **“aggregation/missing intercept” problem**
 - Estimand of micro experiment is a direct (“partial equilibrium”) response, and so free of the general equilibrium effects that enter the full response \ominus
Why missing intercept? looking across agents absorbs common aggregate effects = enters fixed effect in cross-sectional regression on aggregate shock
 - Concrete example: direct response to lump-sum stimulus check misses tax financing, price effects (interest rates, relative goods prices), Keynesian multiplier, ...
- This lecture will discuss **two possible solutions**: [illustrate both for stimulus check application]
 1. Macro as explicitly aggregated micro
 2. Different shocks share identical GE effects (e.g., a common “demand multiplier”)

Roadmap

- We'll begin by formalizing the **aggregation problem**

- Using sequence-space techniques: you can generally write

$$\text{total causal effect} = \text{micro estimate} + \text{GE effects}$$

- We will illustrate this decomposition in a model of stimulus checks. Will be straightforward to see that such decompositions are very general.

- We will then discuss our two **solution strategies**

- Both will have a similar flavor: use model structure to arrive at results of the form

$$\text{total causal effect} = \text{micro estimate} + \text{something that is (cleanly?) measurable}$$

- The approaches will differ in how much model structure is imposed/how easy the measurement part is

Outline

1. The Aggregation Problem

2. Solutions

Macro As Explicitly Aggregated Micro
Commonality in GE: “Demand Equivalence”

3. Class Summary

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A model of stimulus checks [Wolf (2022)]

- The next slide will provide a brief sketch of a **rich structural GE model**
 - Model blocks: heterogeneous households [“HANK”], heterogeneous firms [Khan-Thomas, Ottonello-Winberry], fiscal & monetary policy
 - Solution method: linearization + perfect foresight [= sequence-space]
 - Policy experiment: date-0 stimulus check, financed with future taxes
- In the context of this lecture the **purpose of the model** is twofold:
 1. First: provide an explicit worked-out example of the decomposition
$$\text{total causal effect} = \text{micro estimate} + \text{GE effects}$$
 2. Later: formally justify our two approaches to solving the aggregation problem

A model of stimulus checks [Wolf (2022)]

1. Households

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_{it}, \ell_{it}) \right] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & c_{it} + b_{it} = w_t \ell_{it} \mathbf{e}_{it} + \boldsymbol{\tau}_t + \frac{1 + i_{t-1}^b}{1 + \pi_t} b_{it-1} + d_t \end{aligned}$$

+ borr. constraint $b_{it} \geq \underline{b}$ & ℓ_{it} is demand-determined (= **wage-NKPC**)

2. Production: \approx canonical heterogeneous-firm model, e.g. see Ottonello-Winberry (2021)

$$\max \quad \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\prod_{s=0}^{t-1} \frac{1 + \pi_s}{1 + r_{s-1}^b} \right) d_{jt} \right]$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad d_{jt} = p_t^l y(z_{jt}, k_{jt-1}, \ell_{jt}) - w_t \ell_{jt} - [k_{jt} - (1 - \delta)k_{jt-1}] - \text{adj. costs} - b_{jt} + \frac{1 + i_{t-1}^b}{1 + \pi_t} b_{jt-1}$$

+ fin. constraints on $\{b_{jt}^f, d_{jt}^l\}$ & output is demand-determined (= **price-NKPC**)

3. Government: spend & tax, set nominal rate (debt & monetary rules)

A PE-GE decomposition

- **Objective:** find aggregate causal effects of a transfer stimulus policy
 - Policy details: transfer path $\boldsymbol{\tau}^x = \boldsymbol{\tau}^x(\varepsilon_\tau)$ sent out to all households, financed with some (uniform) future tax path $\boldsymbol{\tau}^e = \boldsymbol{\tau}^e(\varepsilon_\tau)$, total taxes/transfers are $\boldsymbol{\tau} = \boldsymbol{\tau}^x + \boldsymbol{\tau}^e$
 - Preview: will later also look at gov't spending shock $\boldsymbol{g} = \boldsymbol{g}(\varepsilon_g)$ (+ tax financing)
- Our key tool for formalizing the aggregation problem will be a **PE-GE** decomposition of the household consumption-savings decision: [as usual: use sequence-space cons. function]

$$\hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau \equiv \mathbf{c}(\mathbf{p}_\tau, \boldsymbol{\tau}_\tau^x) - \mathbf{c}(\bar{\mathbf{p}}, \bar{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^x)$$

- Notation: bars = steady state, hats & subscripts = IRFs, boldface = time paths
- HH's receive **transfer** $\boldsymbol{\tau}^x$ and face **GE feedback** \mathbf{p} ($\mathbf{i}_b, \boldsymbol{\pi}, \mathbf{w}$, tax financing $\boldsymbol{\tau}^e, \dots$)

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$$\hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau = \underbrace{\hat{\mathbf{c}}(\bar{\mathbf{p}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}_\tau^x)}_{\text{PE impact: } \hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau^{PE}} + \underbrace{\hat{\mathbf{c}}(\hat{\mathbf{p}}_\tau, \bar{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^x)}_{\text{GE feedback: } \hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau^{GE}}$$

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Interpreting micro estimands

- We already discussed that **cross-sectional data** can give **“PE” effects**:
 - Let $\varepsilon_{\tau it} = \xi_{\tau it} \times \varepsilon_{\tau t}$ ($\xi_{\tau it}$ is iid), and consider a cross-sectional regression of the form

$$c_{it+h} = \alpha_i + \delta_t + \beta_{\tau h} \times \varepsilon_{\tau it} + u_{it+h}, \quad h = 0, 1, 2, \dots$$

- Then the OLS estimand of $\beta_{\tau} \equiv (\beta_{\tau 0}, \beta_{\tau 1}, \dots)'$ satisfies

$$\beta_{\tau} \times \varepsilon_{\tau t} = \int_0^1 \frac{\partial c_i}{\partial \varepsilon_{\tau 0}} di \times \varepsilon_{\tau t} = \hat{c}_{\tau}^{PE}$$

- Here I'm using heterogeneous exposure to an agg. shock [as in Johnson-Parker-Souleles]. Last time we instead used shocks w/o aggregate effects [notably, lottery wins]. Both give \hat{c}_{τ}^{PE} .
- **Aggregation problem**: how do we go from the estimable \hat{c}_{τ}^{PE} to \hat{c}_{τ} ?
 - In general we are missing the GE term \hat{c}_{τ}^{GE} . Can use \hat{c}_{τ}^{PE} only if the GE term is zero (= units without a direct treatment show no overall response)
 - “Missing intercept”: GE effects that are orthogonal to treatment heterogeneity $\varepsilon_{\tau it}$ are necessarily differenced out [when regressing on an aggregate shock]

A more general discussion

- This approach to **PE-GE** decompositions & aggregation is very general
 - Consider some general outcome of interest x . Suppose x is directly affected by a shock ε and GE “prices” p . Assume in sequence-space you can write

$$\mathbf{x} = \mathcal{X}(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}, \boldsymbol{p})$$

- Then we get the decomposition

$$\hat{\mathbf{x}} = \underbrace{\mathcal{X}_\varepsilon \times \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}}_{\text{PE impact}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{X}_p \times \hat{\boldsymbol{p}}}_{\text{GE feedback}}$$

- Can easily see how investment subject to tax incentives q fits into this:

$$\hat{\mathbf{i}} = \mathcal{I}_q \times \hat{\mathbf{q}} + \mathcal{I}_w \times \hat{\mathbf{w}} + \mathcal{I}_r \times \hat{\mathbf{r}} + \dots$$

- **Limitation:** assumes price-taking behavior

Other examples

Many other **famous cross-sectional studies** face the same problem:

1. Regional vs. aggregate fiscal multipliers
Nakamura & Steinsson, Chodorow-Reich
2. China shock (regional import competition & employment)
Autor, Dorn & Hansen
3. Bank lending cuts to firms
Chodorow-Reich, Herreño
4. Consumption responses to stock market gains
Chodorow-Reich, Nenov & Simsek
5. ...

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Commonality in GE: “Demand Equivalence”

3. Class Summary

What are possible strategies for solving the aggregation problem?

- Standard approach: match micro estimate in **fully specified structural model**, then use that model for aggregation

Often not easy to see: what features of the model matter for **PE-GE** mapping?

- Recently popular **semi-structural** alternative: impose enough structure so that the “missing intercept” (e.g., \hat{c}_T^{GE}) becomes directly measurable
- I’ll here review two examples of this, both for the **stimulus check application**:
 - a) Consider a model in which the micro estimates at the same time also pin down \hat{c}_T^{GE} (“macro as explicitly aggregated micro”) **Auclert, Rognlie & Straub (2018)**
 - b) Consider a model in which more readily available time series evidence on other shocks simultaneously pins down \hat{c}_T^{GE} (“commonality in GE”) **Wolf (2022)**

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Aggregation via the IKC

- Our model so far was quite rich: capital, firm-level financial frictions, general monetary rule, partially flexible prices & wages, ...
- Let's now simplify to return to the **IKC model** from last lecture:

- Adapted to today's notation, the equilibrium path $\widehat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau$ solves

$$\mathcal{C}_y \widehat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau + \mathcal{C}_\tau (\widehat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^x + \widehat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^e) = \widehat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau$$

- Thus we have

$$\begin{aligned}\widehat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau^{PE} &= \mathcal{C}_\tau \widehat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^x \\ \widehat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau^{GE} &= [I - \mathcal{C}_y]^{-1} \mathcal{C}_\tau (\widehat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^x + \widehat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^e) - \mathcal{C}_\tau \widehat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^x\end{aligned}$$

- The direct effect is $\mathcal{C}_\tau \times \widehat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^x$. But micro data can (in principle) get all of $\mathcal{C}_y/\mathcal{C}_\tau$ and so (through the model structure) the full GE counterfactual

Interpretation: $\widehat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau$ will reflect (i) direct effect, (ii) fiscal financing rule, and (iii) Keynesian GE multiplier

Aside: getting all of C_y/C_τ

- Empirical evidence so far: mostly on first column of C_y/C_τ
 - Main takeaway: households on average *gradually* spend (small) lump-sum income receipts
Fagereng-Holm-Natvik (2020)
- What about the rest? limited empirical evidence, but strong theoretical predictions
See Wolf (2022). Shape obtains in OLG & bond-in-utility. HANK is just slightly different ...

$$C_\tau \approx \omega \times \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \frac{\theta}{1+\bar{r}} & \left(\frac{\theta}{1+\bar{r}}\right)^2 & \dots \\ \theta & 1 & \frac{\theta}{1+\bar{r}} & \dots \\ \theta^2 & \theta & 1 & \dots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}$$

Note the \approx . In fact MPCs along the main diagonal decline somewhat, reflecting anticipation.

- Given (i) first column (from data) + (ii) model extrapolation for rest of C_τ/C_y + (iii) as'n of IKC model structure we can recover \hat{C}_τ for *any* stimulus check policy

+ Reduce aggregation problem to **micro measurement exercise**

- All macro identifying assumptions are embedded in the model. Conditional on that, we only need **PE matrices**, estimable from micro data alone
- Note: micro experiments both give the **direct effect** and the way to **aggregate it**

- Approach requires very **strong restrictions on the model**

- Recall the **simplifying assumptions**: no capital, no firm borrowing frictions, single asset, single final good, monetary authority that fixes the real rate (and issues real bonds), ...

- Actually the micro measurement exercise is still too hard, thus **still need model**

- Micro data are enough to get first column of C_τ and C_y , then need **extrapolation** via HA consumption-savings problem for rest of the matrices

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Commonality in GE

- Could we use empirical evidence on the **aggregate effects of shock/policy A** to learn about the **missing GE effects** for some micro study on **policy B**?

Could be useful if A is somehow easier to analyze than B in the aggregate time series ...

- Less abstractly: the CBO actually uses a variant of this idea for **“demand shocks”**
 - Micro causal variation can tell us how much stimulus checks/bonus depreciation stimulate “demand” (consumer spending/firm investment expenditure)
 - Time series literature has identified aggregate multipliers of gov’t spending increases

can we just combine the two?

- Remainder of this lecture: formalize this idea in the general model from before, discuss implementation details, assess generality & limitations [closely following Wolf (2022)]

Identification result

Proposition (“demand equivalence”)

Return to the general model from before, and consider a policy ϵ_{τ} . Suppose that:

A1 ...

A2 ...

A3 ...

If a fiscal spending policy shock ϵ_g is s.t. (i) $\hat{g}_g = \hat{c}_{\tau}^{PE}$ and (ii) $\hat{\tau}_g^e = \hat{\tau}_{\tau}^e$, then, to first order,

$$\hat{c}_{\tau} = \underbrace{\hat{c}_{\tau}^{PE}}_{\text{PE response}} + \underbrace{\hat{c}_g}_{\text{GE feedback}}$$

Identification result

Proposition (“demand equivalence”)

Return to the general model from before, and consider a policy ϵ_τ . Suppose that:

A1 Households and gov't consume a **common final good**.

This assumption has no bite in our model since it only features one good anyway. I'm stating it just to make clear the importance of this restriction.

A2 Households and gov't borrow and lend at **identical rates**.

This assumption has no bite in our model since there is only one asset. Again just stating for emphasis.

A3 There are **no wealth effects** in labor supply and/or wages are fully **rigid**.

If a fiscal spending policy shock ϵ_g is s.t. (i) $\hat{g}_g = \hat{c}_\tau^{PE}$ and (ii) $\hat{\tau}_g^e = \hat{\tau}_\tau^e$, then, to first order,

$$\hat{c}_\tau = \underbrace{\hat{c}_\tau^{PE}}_{\text{PE response}} + \underbrace{\hat{c}_g}_{\text{GE feedback}}$$

Proof sketch [see Wolf (2021) for details]

- Equilibrium = solution to many mkt-clearing conditions + other restrictions
[output, gov't budget, asset markets, labor, equity valuation, asset arbitrage, Taylor rule, ...]

$$\underbrace{\mathbf{H}(\mathbf{p}; \boldsymbol{\varepsilon})}_{\text{full equilibrium system}} = \mathbf{0}$$

- Proof strategy: identical **excess demand/supply** in all markets

A1 **Output**: by property (i), identical demand pressure for common final good

$$\mathbf{c}(\mathbf{p}; \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}) + \mathbf{g}(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}) = \mathbf{y}(\mathbf{p}; \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}) - \mathbf{i}(\mathbf{p}; \boldsymbol{\varepsilon})$$

A2 **Gov't budget**: by property (ii), identical tax financing for transfers & gov't spending


$$\boldsymbol{\tau}^e = \boldsymbol{\tau}^e(\mathbf{p}; \boldsymbol{\varepsilon})$$

A3 **Labor**: no shift in labor supply/shift is irrelevant

$$\boldsymbol{\ell}^h(\mathbf{p}; \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}) = \boldsymbol{\ell}^f(\mathbf{p}; \boldsymbol{\varepsilon})$$


Numerical illustration

Let's now see this result in action in a sticky-wage HANK model ...




Numerical illustration

Let's now see this result in action in a sticky-wage HANK model ...



Numerical illustration

Let's now see this result in action in a sticky-wage HANK model ...



We can leverage this result to operationalize the CBO intuition ...

Measurement inputs

Result suggests that we can combine **cross-sectional** and **time-series** measurement:

1. **Cross-sectional** identification

$$\beta_{\tau} \times \varepsilon_{\tau t} = \int_0^1 \frac{\partial \mathbf{c}_i}{\partial \varepsilon_{\tau 0}} di \times \varepsilon_{\tau t} = \hat{\mathbf{c}}_{\tau}^{PE}$$

2. Fiscal **time series** experiments

- We have seen several time series approaches to identifying fiscal spending shocks and so estimating $\hat{\mathbf{c}}_g$. E.g.: (i) narrative, (ii) forecast errors, (iii) timing/exclusion restrictions Blanchard-Perotti (2002), Mountford-Uhlig (2009), Ramey (2011), Caldara-Kamps (2017), ...
- Summary: most estimates lie “in a fairly narrow range, 0.6 to 1” Ramey (2018)

combine them to arrive at $\hat{\mathbf{c}}_{\tau}$

Matching experiments

Challenge: necessary condition to combine experiments is identical net excess demand — $\hat{\mathbf{g}}_g = \hat{\mathbf{c}}_T^{PE}$. Given $\hat{\mathbf{c}}_T^{PE}$, how can we find the required gov't spending shock?

- Natural approach: look for best **linear combination**
 - Suppose time series analysis has identified several shocks with paths $\hat{\mathbf{g}}_{g_k}$. Projection:

$$\hat{\mathbf{c}}_T^{PE} = \sum_{k=1}^{n_k} \gamma_k \times \hat{\mathbf{g}}_{g_k} + \text{error}$$

- Then

$$\sum_{k=1}^{n_k} \gamma_k \times \hat{\mathbf{c}}_{g_k}$$

promises to capture general equilibrium effects *up to the error term*

- Note that this is the same multi-shock idea as what we used for policy rule counterfactuals

Implementation & interpretation


- Suppose you have ensured that $\hat{g}_g = \hat{c}_\tau^{PE}$. Now construct

$$\hat{c}_\tau = \underbrace{\hat{c}_\tau^{PE}}_{\text{PE response}} + \underbrace{\sum_{k=1}^{n_k} \gamma_k}_{\text{GE feedback}} \times \hat{c}_{g_k} \quad (1)$$

How should we interpret (1)? Valid **GE** counterfactual for stimulus check shock ε_τ s.t.:

- ε_τ and ε_g are associated with the same movements in taxes (recall: condition (ii) in th'm)
E.g. for stimulus check policy: same financing rule
- ε_τ and ε_g occur in the same macro environment (same policy regime, cyclical state, ...)
Why? recall that th'm used (log-)linearization

Application: PE demand




- Cross-sectional identification

[Parker-Souleles-Johnson-McClelland (2013)]


- Experiment: one-off stimulus checks (around \$600 per household)
- Find: strong, very short-lived response (here: extrapolated from $t = 2$ onwards)

Application: PE demand



- Cross-sectional identification [Parker-Soules-Johnson-McClelland (2013)]
 - Experiment: one-off stimulus checks (around \$600 per household)
 - Find: strong, very short-lived response (here: extrapolated from $t = 2$ onwards)
- Time series identification [Ramey (2011)]
 - Identification as 'n': forecast errors as IV
 - Find: short-lived uptick in g , deficit-financed, muted interest rate response


Application: GE counterfactual



- Aggregate via demand equivalence:

$$\hat{c}_\tau = \underbrace{\hat{c}_d^{PE}}_{\text{PE response}} + \underbrace{\hat{c}_g}_{\text{GE feedback}}$$

Application: GE counterfactual



- Aggregate via demand equivalence:

$$\hat{C}_\tau = \underbrace{\hat{C}_d^{PE}}_{\text{PE response}} + \underbrace{\hat{C}_g}_{\text{GE feedback}}$$

- Main result: strong impact stimulus with

full C response \approx **micro estimate**

- Interpretation: same conclusion in *any* model s.t.:
 - demand equivalence holds
 - micro & macro moments are matched

How should we interpret these results?

- So far: valid counterfactuals for *any model* that satisfies **demand equivalence**
demand equivalence + cross-sectional & time series moments from literature \Rightarrow our results (= “sufficient statistics” in public finance)
- But the required assumptions are of course quite **strong**
- **Q**: what does it look like in models that break exact demand equivalence?
 - **A**: probably miss some GE crowding-out = upward-biased [▶ Details](#)

Discussion

- + Applies for a large **space of models**
 - Allows for **investment** (+ very general firm block) & **general monetary rule**, though still requires single good & no borrowing frictions
- + Implementable purely through **empirical measurement**
 - **Not always applicable**
 - Need to find experiments so that **net excess demand paths are aligned**
 - Works only for demand shocks, so **not a general-purpose aggregation methodology**
 - Need to **trust time series evidence** for a different shock
 - Requires relatively greater confidence in time series estimates for **fiscal spending experiment** than the **demand shock of interest**


Appendix

Demand equivalence: accuracy

- Idea: in models that **break equivalence** compute the plim of aggregation procedure
 1. Estimated HANK model [Smets-Wouters (2007) + Kaplan-Moll-Violante (2018)]
Note: breaks equivalence *only* via labor assumption
 2. Further extensions that jointly break asn's 1-3
- **Main result:** miss some **GE crowding-out**

▶ back

Estimated HANK Model



▶ back


- Estimate HANK model, solve at posterior mode
Results similar across the posterior distribution ▶ Details
- First finding: nearly exact in rich estimated model
- What's going on?

- Equivalence fails *only* due to labor channel

$$\hat{c}_\tau = \hat{c}_\tau^{PE} + \hat{c}_g + \text{error}(\hat{\ell}_\tau^{PE})$$

- But wages are quite sticky ($\phi_w = 0.6$)
- Well-known: for transitory fluctuations, with sticky prices/wages, labor wedge shocks matter little
Christiano (2011, 2012), Auclert et al. (2020)

Further extensions




- For several further model variants compute

$$\text{error} = \frac{(c_{\tau}^{PE} + c_g) - c_{\tau}}{c_{\tau,0}}$$

- Check violations of each key assumption:

▶ back

Further extensions




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A1 flexible wages & alternative preferences

▶ back

Further extensions




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 - A1 flexible wages & alternative preferences
 - A2 multiple goods, gov't investment

▶ back

Further extensions




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 - A1 flexible wages & alternative preferences
 - A2 multiple goods, gov't investment
 - A3 multiple assets, small open economy

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
A2 multiple goods, gov't investment

A3 multiple assets, small open economy

main message: approximation is biased *up*

▶ back

Further extensions



▶ back

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- Check violations of each key assumption:

A1 flexible wages & alternative preferences

A2 multiple goods, gov't investment

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main message: approximation is biased *up*

- But: bound likely to be tight for checks
small & transitory, little evidence of labor adjustment,
do not use gov't investment, ...